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Introduction
Governments often use tax incentives to stimulate entrepreneurship and economic growth (e.g., Lee and Gordon 2005) . While some reforms target specific industries or large multinational companies, other reforms target small and medium-sized businesses. Cutting dividend taxes for small businesses can be seen as a way to increase investment, thereby stimulating activity in firms and the economy. A lower dividend tax rate reduces the required rate of return on investments financed by new share issues (Harberger, 1962 (Harberger, , 1966 Feldstein, 1970; Sørensen, 1995) . If dividend tax cuts reduce the cost of capital, financially constrained firms may increase investment following a dividend tax cut (Becker, Jacob, and Jacob, 2013; Alstadsaeter and Jacob 2014) . 1 However, in addition to these intended investment effects, beneficial tax rules for particular groups create incentives and opportunities for income shifting (Stiglitz, 1985; Slemrod, 1995; Gordon and Slemrod, 2000) . Income shifting is the process of transferring income across time, income categories, and tax brackets to reduce total tax payments. This is legal tax avoidance and does not involve immediate real effects; it is a purely tax-motivated relabeling of existing income. Very little is known empirically about the income shifting of individuals. Pirttilä and Selin (2011) provide evidence of income shifting around the introduction of the dual income tax system in Finland in 1993, which reduced the marginal tax rates on capital income for some taxpayers. The authors find little or no response from ordinary wage earners, but self-employed individuals seem to have increased reported capital income.
We investigate whether a dividend tax cut encourages owner-managers in closely held corporations (CHCs) to participate in income shifting, income generation, or both. Swedish tax law defines a corporation as closely held if four or fewer active shareholders own at least 50% of the shares. A shareholder is active if contributing considerably to the corporation's profit 1 Further, the openness of the economy drives the effect of a dividend tax cut. A decrease in the dividend tax rate for smaller corporations in an open economy can decrease the cost of capital if these firms are owned by domestic investors (Apel and Södersten, 1999; Jacob and Södersten, 2012; Lindhe and Södersten, 2012). generation. 2 These owner-managers can determine how much corporate profit to distribute as wages and dividends. By reclassifying highly taxed income (labor income) as a lower-taxed type of income (dividend income), individuals can reduce their total tax payments and increase their net-of-tax income for the same before-tax income.
The 2006 Swedish tax reform reduced the dividend tax rate for owner-managers in
CHCs by 10 percentage points. Labor and corporate income tax rates remained constant. As a result, incentives to relabel labor income as dividend income increased. The reform also increased the imputed dividend allowance, which is the amount of dividends taxable at the favorable dividend tax rate. Dividends in excess of the imputed dividend allowance are taxed as earned income at the owner level. This isolated dividend tax change in dividend income is advantageous since our results on income shifting behavior in this context are not affected by concerns about the macroeconomic effects that accompany large tax reforms, such as around the introduction of the dual income tax.
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Using rich Swedish micro data on corporations, partnerships, self-employed businesses, and their owner-managers, we are able to observe reported income across several tax bases for the period 2000-2011. Our panel data of the entire Swedish population comprise information on income and socioeconomic variables. We use a matching difference-in-difference estimator around the 2006 tax changes and compare the income of owner-managers of CHCs to the income of owners of unincorporated businesses (who were not affected by the dividend tax cut). We find robust evidence of income shifting behavior. Owner-managers of CHCs have substituted earned income with dividend income since the reform. On average, CHC corporation owners shifted about 6%, or SEK 30,000, of their overall income from labor 2 Multiple family members count as a single shareholder when we define whether a corporation is closely or widely held. A shareholder is active if contributing to the firm's profit generation to a considerable extent. See Section 2 of the present paper for a description of the rules and see also Alstadsaeter and Jacob (2012, Chapter 3 and Appendix I) for a thorough discussion of these rules and the 2006 rule changes.
See Agell, Englund, and Södersten (1996) on the 1991 introduction of the Swedish dual income tax system. Our paper also relates to theoretical papers on the dual income tax, such as those of Fjaerli and Lund (2001) , Lindhe, Södersten, and Öberg (2002 , 2004 ), and Sørensen, 2005 income to dividend income. We find no evidence that the overall income of CHC owners increased relative to that of owners of unincorporated businesses. This indicates that CHC owners did not generate additional income in response to the dividend tax cut. Instead, they shifted income across tax bases.
We further evaluate heterogeneity in income shifting across owner-managers by investigating the role of tax incentives in income shifting. Our empirical results suggest that income shifting behavior is more pronounced for high-income CHC owners who enjoy larger tax benefits from converting labor income into dividend income. Finally, we test whether access to income shifting affects the magnitude of the income that is relabeled. We find that individuals with a high ownership share and thus stronger influence on dividend payout policies and wage structure shift more income across bases than owners with minority interests. In fact, CHC owners with minority shareholdings are less able to shape the income shifting process according to their preferences.
Our sample covers the entire population of business owners and we exploit the differences across these individuals. One potential concern about this study is external validity, since income shifting incentives apply to only a small fraction of individuals. However, these individuals, namely, CHC owners, are an important fraction of the entire economy. These CHC owners, or about 3% of the population, generate about 7.6% of the total income and contribute about 8.5% to income tax revenue (2007 values) . Further, in the academic literature, CHCs represent an important yet often overlooked part of the economy. About 60% of all corporations are closely held. Therefore, CHC owner income shifting is of great relevance for policy makers and the economy.
This paper is part of a broader exploration of the effects of dividend tax policy on participation in tax avoidance and tax evasion Jacob 2013a, 2013b ) and on the investment and payout behavior of unlisted firms (Jacob and Alstadsaeter 2013; Alstadsaeter and Jacob 2014) . The paper closest to this one is that of Alstadsaeter and Jacob (2013a) , who analyze the establishment of specific tax-sheltering firms. Access, awareness, and incentives explain the heterogeneity observed in tax avoidance participation. In contrast, the present paper provides empirical evidence of the magnitude of and heterogeneity in the income shifting of owner-managers from the labor income tax base to the dividend income tax base.
Income shifting activity across tax bases distorts aggregate statistics (Slemrod, 1995; Gordon and Slemrod, 2000) . It can lead to inaccurate conclusions on the effectiveness of tax stimulus packages. Our results imply that the comprehensive evaluation of any tax reform needs to consider all tax bases that are affected. Myopic focus on a single tax base when evaluating a tax reform can lead to misleading conclusions, for instance, if labor supply elasticities are measured only by labor income without accounting for high-income individuals' potential to relabel wage income as capital income (le Maire and Schjerning, 2013) . Our results also point toward a potential policy trade-off. A reduction in dividend taxes leads to income shifting. At the same time, a reduction in the dividend tax rate can improve the allocation of investments as funds are shifted from cash-rich to cash-poor firms (Becker, Jacob, and Jacob 2013; Alstadsaeter and Jacob 2014) . Hence, policy makers face a trade-off between increasing income shifting opportunities and raising efficiency through the improved allocation of investments.
The Swedish tax code, the 2006 tax reform, and tax incentives
Sweden has a dual income tax, with a progressive tax on earned income and a proportional tax on capital income. Progressivity in the tax on earned income stems from a basic flat municipality tax and two additional state taxes, that apply at different thresholds.
Earned income comprises labor income and profits from unincorporated businesses. Wages are additionally subject to social security contributions at the firm level. Up to a certain threshold, these contributions generate benefits to the employee in the form of health insurance, unemployment benefits, and pension benefits. However, above this threshold, these contributions cease to generate additional benefits and become a pure tax. 4 The resulting combined marginal tax burden on labor income ranges from 31.6% to 67.2% (2005 values) .
Capital income is taxed at the proportional tax rate of 30% at the individual level. Since dividends are also taxed at the corporate level, the combined tax burden on dividends amounted to 49.6% until 2005. For high-income earners, there was a 17.6 percentage-point difference in the top marginal tax rates on wage income and dividend income. This represented a strong incentive to reclassify wage income as dividend income to reduce total tax payments.
The so-called 3:12 rules apply to active owners of CHCs and are designed to limit the scope of income shifting. A corporation is closely held if four of fewer active shareholders own at least 50% of the shares. 5 A shareholder is active if contributing considerably to the firm's profit generation (see , Chapter 3 and Appendix I, for a detailed description of the rules). We denote active shareholders as owner-managers. Dividends to the owner-managers of CHCs that are within an imputed Dividend allowance are taxed as dividends and dividends exceeding the dividend allowance are taxed as earned income. 6 Under the so-called general imputation rule, the dividend allowance is a function of equity and wage costs for the firm and is distributed to each owner-manager according to ownership share.
7 Table 1 provides an overview of developments in marginal tax rates for the period 2000-2011.
[Insert Table 1 about here] In 2006, the taxation of dividends from CHCs was reformed to foster entrepreneurship, investment, and job creation. 8 Given a budget of SEK 1 billion in granted tax relief, the government tried to achieve these goals by making tax rules more beneficial for business 4 See Table A1 .2 in for these exact thresholds and more discussion. Figure 1 illustrates the data structure.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
We exclude observations with missing information on age, gender, or marital status.
We also censor extreme observations outside the first and 99th percentiles of the income distribution to prevent extreme values and outliers from distorting and losing precision in our estimates. Finally, we include only observations for which the individual's age is between 18 and 70. Our final data set consists of 302,534 business owners and 3,410,540 observations over the period 2000-2011, with 50% of the observations comprising CHC owner-managers and 50% comprising the self-employed and owners of partnerships. 
Definition of the treatment and control groups
We define the treatment and control groups based on pre-reform characteristics to Our identification of income shifting effects is based on the change in the incentive and scope for relabeling labor income as dividend income. Our treatment group, CHC owners, experienced a change in incentives in 2006. The control group was unaffected by this change.
Since we base assignment to the treatment and control groups on the 2003-2005 status, owners of partnerships could change their organizational form to a CHC. We would still assign these to the control group, since these individuals were partnership owners prior to the reform. The opportunity to change organizational form works against finding evidence of income shifting, since the control group would respond similarly. In this case, the estimates presented in Sections 5 and 6 are lower-bound estimates.
To ensure that the business owners in the control and treatment groups are similar and that they differ only in access to income shifting (CHCs versus the self-employed), we additionally apply exact one-to-one matching without replacement. We use the decile of labor income distribution, the decile of capital income distribution, demographic characteristics, and county fixed effects as matching variables. The matching is performed on pre-reform characteristics for the years 2003-2005. In the Web Appendix, we describe in detail the matching procedure. The empirical analysis uses the matched sample throughout.
Income shifting or income generation: Graphical evidence
As discussed above, the 2006 tax reform increased both the incentive and access for owner-managers in CHCs to reclassify wage income as lower-taxed dividend income within the dividend allowance. The simplest way to find indications for income shifting is to track overall income and income composition over time. Since 80% of CHC owners apply this rule, the scope for income shifting increased. In addition, most owner-managers using the general rule experienced large increases in their imputed dividend allowances due to changes in the imputation methods, for instance, by including owner wages in the imputation base. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 support these findings.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
From the graphical analysis, we conclude that the overall incomes of CHC owners and business owners of unincorporated businesses follow a common trend. Since CHC owners 9 We include tax-exempt dividends in dividend income that CHC owners could pay out prior to 2006.
have managed to generate a larger fraction of their income in the form of dividends that substitute for earned income as of 2006, the dividend tax cut of 2006 appears to have spurred income shifting. We next analyze income development and income composition for our treatment and control groups in more detail.
Income shifting or income generation: Matching difference-in-difference estimates
Baseline results
We provide matching difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the 2006 tax cut on overall, earned, and capital income. Since our aggregate observations can be driven by heterogeneity across individuals, we need to control for individual socioeconomic factors. We thus specify the regression model as
where , represents our dependent variables, estimated separately. We use five dependent variables: 1) overall pre-tax income (Overall Income), 2) pre-tax earned income The first three variables are included as natural logarithms. When assessing pre-tax income variables, we take tax-exempt dividends into account. That is, we add tax-exempt dividends from the CHC to overall pre-tax income and to capital income to assess total income from the firm independent of payout channel. In addition, since some business owners have zero dividends or even zero earned income, the number of observations is smaller when we use the natural logarithm of earned income or of dividend income. To address concerns that this could result in selection bias, we additionally use the percentage of income derived as earned income and the percentage of income derived as dividend income as dependent variables, which are defined for the entire sample. 10 Matching alters neither the sign nor the significance of the results (see Tables A.3 to A.6 of Web-Appendix). The results are very similar when using the more heterogeneous sample and confirm our findings.
Instead, they generated less overall private income (about 2% less It appears that owner-managers of CHCs relabeled earned income as dividend income in response to the 2006 reform to reduce total tax payments.
[Insert Table 3 about here] The second sample we analyze is the entire sample period. The long-term sample covers 2000-2011. Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates. We obtain robust evidence that the overall income of CHC owners has not increased relative to that of business owners of unincorporated businesses after 2006 (Table 4 , Column 1). In contrast to the immediate response, the long-term estimate for overall income is not significant (p-value = 0.934) and confirms the graphical evidence of Figure 1 , that there is no systematic change in the overall income of owner-managers of CHCs compared to that of unincorporated business owners. [Insert Table 4 about here]
Effect of tax incentives in income shifting
After having established the result that income shifting exists across CHC owners, we next focus on heterogeneity in the response to the 2006 tax reform. The changes in the 3:12 rules were most beneficial for individuals subject to the state tax of 20 percentage points on earned income. The effective tax burden on dividends of 42.4% was then below the income tax burden on labor income of at least 51%. See Table 1 for a detailed description of the tax rates, thresholds, and development over time.
Individuals below the state tax threshold had no incentives for this type of income shifting. We therefore split the sample into two groups according to the prior year's tax status We additionally test these graphical results in a regression framework. In Table 5 , we rerun the regressions from Table 4 percentage of overall income realized as dividends increased by an additional 1.4% after the reform if the CHC owner was subject to the top tax. In sum, this result indicates that heterogeneity in participation in income shifting is related to the (lack of) tax incentive.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Heterogeneity in access to income shifting
Next, we examine the role of access to income shifting. Alstadsaeter and Jacob (2013a) show that not every taxpayer with tax incentives and tax awareness actually participates in income shifting. An individual needs access to income shifting. A lack of access can explain why not all who have a tax incentive actually participate in legal tax avoidance. Our definitions of control and treatment groups, that is, CHC owners versus owners of partnerships and selfemployed, follow the logic of this argument, since only the owner-managers of CHCs are able to relabel earned income as dividend income from the CHC. We next exploit differences in access to income shifting across CHC owners. In particular, we argue that income shifting from earned income to dividend income depends on bargaining power and ownership share in the company. An owner-manager who fully owns a company can decide on the optimal wagedividend mix. If an owner-manager, however, owns only a minority share, the owner-manager has less bargaining power and opportunity to shift income from the labor to the capital income tax base. For example, Jacob and Alstadsaeter (2013) show that the tax sensitivity of the corporate payouts of unlisted firms is related to the number of firm owners.
To test the prediction that access to income shifting affects the extent to which income is shifted across tax bases, we sort CHC owners according to their ownership share. The High Share group comprises CHC owner-managers who own more than 75% of the CHC. The Low Share group comprises CHC owner-managers who own less than 25%. Following the logic of Figure 4 , Figure 5 presents the differences in % Earned Income and % Dividend Income between the High Share and Low Share groups. Prior to the reform, the difference in % Earned
Income and % Dividend Income is very close to zero. That is, income composition is similar across groups. After the reform, the ability to adjust the income composition in accordance with the changed incentives is higher for the High Share group than for the Low Share group.
More specifically, High Share CHC owners can increase (decrease) dividends (earned income)
to a larger extent than Low Share CHC owners.
[Insert Figure 5 about here] Table 6 quantifies the differences in the ability to adjust to the changed incentives in a regression framework. The estimates are based on the sample of all CHC owners. We include an interaction between Post×High Share and Post×Low Share. As in Table 5 , we use % Earned Income and % Dividend Income as dependent variables. The results in Columns 3 and 6 show that relative to the average CHC owner with an ownership share between 25% and 75%, Low Share CHC owners increased their share of earned income and decreased the share of dividend income. That is, owners with less control over the firm shifted less income than the average CHC owner. In contrast, High Share CHC owners could additionally reduce their share of overall income derived from earned income by 0.7%. At the same time, they increased the share of dividend income by 1.3%. These coefficient estimates are relative to those of CHC owners with an ownership share between 25% and 75%.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate substantial heterogeneity in the income shifting response: CHC owners with incentives and the ability to shift income across tax bases utilized the income shifting opportunities created by the 2006 tax reform and CHC owners with low levels of shares in the firm benefited substantially less from these opportunities.
Conclusion
We find robust evidence of income shifting in response to a dividend tax cut. The owner-managers of CHCs increase dividends from CHCs while reducing wage income. The extent of income shifting is positively associated with tax incentives and the ability to shift income. High-income owner-managers substitute highly taxed labor income with lower-taxed dividend income. Through this income shifting process, owner-managers can reduce their total tax payments and experience higher after-tax income growth vis-à-vis the owners of unincorporated businesses. Further, there are frictions in the scope for income shifting. Ownermanagers with low ownership share shift less income across bases due to a lack of bargaining power over majority shareholders. In contrast, owner-managers with high ownership utilize income shifting opportunities more intensively.
The observed behavior has implications for fiscal policy, the design of tax systems, and the evaluation of tax reforms. In general, the presence of income shifting has several effects on the economy (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000) . First, the efficiency of the tax system is reduced.
Second, tax revenues decline. Third, income inequality increases; that is, if mainly highly taxed individuals benefit from this kind of tax planning, income inequality increases and this reduces vertical equity. In addition, horizontal equity is reduced, since only informed individuals with awareness of the tax incentives and methods of tax planning participate in taxminimizing activity (Alstadsaeter and Jacob, 2013a) . Fourth, income shifting provides misleading statistics. Focusing on a single tax base produces misleading statistics if income is shifted across tax bases.
Finally, the presence of income shifting indicates that a policy trade-off: A reduction in dividend taxes leads to income shifting, with all the potential effects stated above. At the same time, a reduction in the dividend tax rate can improve the allocation of investments, since funds are shifted from cash-rich to cash-poor firms. Becker, Jacob, and Jacob (2013) show this allocation effect for listed firms in OECD countries and Alstadsaeter and Jacob (2014) provide empirical evidence that this effect also holds for unlisted corporations. A dividend tax reduction shifts investments from cash-rich to cash-poor firms and thereby increases efficiency. Hence, policy makers face a trade-off between income shifting opportunities while raising efficiency through the improved allocation of investments.
Lindhe, Tobias, Jan Södersten, and Ann Öberg (2002) This table presents regression results using the matched sample of CHC owners (treatment group) and owners of unlimited liability firms (control group). We use overall income, earned income, dividend income, the percentage of overall income derived as earned income (% Earned Income), and the percentage of overall income derived as dividend income (% Dividend Income) as dependent variables. Overall, earned, and dividend income are defined as natural logarithm. Independent variables cover the interaction between Post and Treatment and individual characteristics (see Table A .I of the Appendix). We further include control variables, year fixed-effects, county fixed-effects, and individual fixed-effects. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the individual level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Overall income 
Part I: Matching Procedure
The first part of this appendix describes the matching procedure used in the paper.
The main purpose of our matching approach is to reduce differences across the treatment and control groups. As the treatment group, we use CHC owners who owned (at least) one CHC during The results presented in the paper are robust to using either the full sample or the matched sample. The paper presents the matched sample results. These results are also presented in Part II of this Web-Appendix. This table replicates the results of Table 4 but uses the full sample instead of the matched sample. We use overall income, earned income, dividend income, the percentage of overall income derived as earned income (% Earned Income), and the percentage of overall income derived as dividend income (% Dividend Income) as dependent variables. Overall, earned, and dividend income are defined as natural logarithm. Independent variables cover the interaction between Post and Treatment and individual characteristics (see Table A .I of the Appendix). We further include control variables, year fixed-effects, county fixed-effects, and individual fixedeffects. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the individual level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table replicates Table 6 but uses the full sample of CHC owners. We use the percentage of overall income derived as earned income (% Earned Income) and the percentage of overall income derived as dividend income (% Dividend Income) as dependent variables. We include the interaction between a dummy variable indicating if a CHC owner owns at least 75% of his firm (High Share). Low Share is a dummy variable indicating if a CHC owns less than 25%. We include additional control variables, year fixed-effects, county fixed-effects, and individual fixed-effects as described in Table A .I of the Appendix. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the individual level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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